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Transparency Evolution: More than the Right to Know 
 
Ljiljana Biukovic* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The interaction between international trade and human rights in the context of economic 
globalization often raises questions as to whether international trade and investment treaties 
are a good mechanism to protect human rights and if so, what human rights should be 
protected and how. In the absence of explicit legal linkages between the two areas of 
international law, answers to these questions tend to focus on political dialogue between 
various international actors and institutions obliged to comply with both international trade 
and human rights laws in specific factual situations.1 Two such situations, related to the 
investment of Chinese companies in Peru’s extractive industry projects, are examined in 
this chapter: Shougang’s operation of the Macrona mine and Chinalo’s operation of the 
Toromocho mine.  
 Some scholars argue that trade obligations are constitutionalized in international 
trade treaties as human rights and that international trade treaties could therefore evolve to 
develop mechanisms for the protection of human rights other than economic rights. 2 
Building on the 21st century concepts of the constitutionalism of international trade law 
and the evolution of human rights protection, some scholars believe that the doctrine of 
multilevel governance is the most suitable framework to systematically address the 
problems of fragmentation and coherence in different areas of international law, especially 
those problems arising out of, the relationship between human rights and international trade 
law.3 That doctrine asserts that states, having already conceded some of their regulatory 
powers to international organizations, should act as intermediaries between different layers 
of governance, such as international, transnational, and national.4 States should build the 
framework of interaction of governance institutions on the basis of a clearly defined 
constitutional process including the allocation of powers and the communication among 
the different layers of governance. Others argue that the two areas of law, international 
trade and human rights, should be kept separate because the use of international trade 
institutions to protect human rights is legitimizing a neoliberal and market focused 
                                                        
* Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, UBC. I am grateful to Sarah Biddulph, 
Moshe Hirsch, and Pitman Potter for their comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. Erica 
Zacharias, Peter A. Allard Scholl of Law second year JD student provided valuable research 
assistance. 
1 For further discussions see Frederick M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufmann & Thomas 
Cottier, eds, International Trade and Human Rights; Foundations and Conceptual Issues (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006) and Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn  & 
Elisabeth Bürgi, eds, Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
2 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, this volume, chapter 2. 
3 Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, “The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism”, (2003) 7:1 
Max Planck YB UN L. 299. See also Michael Zürn, “Global Governance as Multi-Level 
Governance” in Henrik Ederlein, Sonja Wälti & Michael Zürn, eds, Handbook on Multi-level 
Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) 80. 
4 Cottier & Hertig, ibid at 313-317. 
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dimension of human rights that does not adequately address the obligations of states to 
protect individual non-economic rights under international human rights law and United 
Nations rules.5 Scholars also argue that the requirement for states to respect of human 
rights, as a condition for the membership in international trade organizations and in order 
to be able to access international financial aid, raises for developing countries sensitive 
issues such as the scope of their remaining regulatory sovereignty and the relevance of 
human rights treaties in the light of developing countries commitment to the WTO regime.6  
 International trade and investment treaties are agreed upon primarily for the 
purpose of advancing trade in goods and services and for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments. The treaties do not directly address the issue of the protection of 
human rights although they indirectly address human rights by creating their own rules of 
governance or by referring to rules of international human rights treaties7. Moreover, they 
create legal rules and institutions that form an integral part of a rule-based system of world 
trade built on principles of non-discrimination and transparency. Human rights law, too, is 
based on these principles. Therefore, international trade law and human rights law seem to 
interact through the principles of governance and the rule of law. 8 The transparency rules 
in those agreements are often cited as evidence of possible incorporation of human rights 
provisions into the international trade regime.9 Hence, transparency is linked to the human 
right to information,10  and to the corresponding correlated duty of states to facilitate 
individuals’ access to information and to participation in public affairs.11 In that context, 
transparency and the right to access information as captured in international treaties, 
including trade treaties, are seen as the basis for the enjoyment of all other human rights.   
 This chapter considers two aspects of the advancement of transparency rules in 
international law and national laws. The first aspect is referred to as the “transparency 
                                                        
5 Philip Alston, “Resisting Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to 
Petersmann”, (2002) 13:4 EJIL 815. But see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Forced to Be Good; Why 
Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
6 See, for example, Sisule Frederich Musungy, “International Trade and Human Rights in Africa: 
A Comment on Conceptual Linkages” in Abbott, Breining-Kaufmann & Cottier, eds, supra note 
1, 321 at 322.  
7 See Thomas Cottier, “Governance, Trade and Human Rights”, in Abbott, Breining-Kaufmann & 
Cottier, eds, supra note 1, 93 at 104, and Susan Ariel Aaronson & Jean Pierre Chauffour, The 
Wedding of Trade and Human Rights: Marriage of Convenience or Permanent Match? WTO 
Research and Analysis, online: WTO 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_15feb11_e.ht
m>. 
8 See Thomas Cottier, “Governance, Trade and Human Rights” in Abbott, Breining-Kaufmann & 
Cottier, eds, supra note 1, 93 at 95. The World Bank Institute broadly defines governance as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.” See World Bank Institute, 
Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008, online: World Bank 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2009/06/29/governance-matters-2009-release-
of-worldwide-governance-indicators-1996-2008>.  
9 Aaronson & Chauffour, The Wedding of Trade and Human Rights, supra note 7. 
10 Maeve McDonagh, “The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law” (2013) 13:1 
HRL Rev 25 at 29. 
11 Mark Festner, “Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor” (2010) 62 Admin L Rev 617. 
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turn,” 12  and it concerns the proliferation of transparency rules in many areas of 
international law, including international economic law and human rights law. The second 
aspect relates to the evolution of transparency policy from the right to know to the duty 
imposed by government on private and public actors to disclose information to the public 
or targeted transparency, and, finally, towards the right of private parties to participate in 
designing transparency policies or collaborative transparency.13 This evolution indicates 
that transparency as a human right is a part of the democratic principle in modern 
administrative states and that the right to access information is the pre-condition for 
citizens’ getting an opportunity to not only learn about government policies but also to 
participate in government’s decision making related to government policies.   
 This chapter examines domestic transparency rules of China and Peru and related 
domestic laws in the context of the countries’ implementation and enforcement of 
international transparency laws. Free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) are cornerstones of economic development of the two countries; in each 
they are important tools for the countries’ integration into the global market.14 Not only 
has the mining industry been at the core of said economic cooperation15 but it has also been 
the subject of global public scrutiny due to its long history of poor resource management, 
including a lack of transparency, its corruption, and its violation of the human rights of 
miners and members of local communities affected by the extractions (‘resource curse’16). 
In response to external and internal requests for increased transparency in the activities of 
their governments and for the broader participation of private actors in the governments’ 
decisions about economic development and the distribution of economic wealth China and 
Peru have engaged in domestic governance reforms. The case studies investigate whether 
                                                        
12 Anne Peters, “The Transparency Turn of International Law” (2015) 1 CJGG 3. 
13 Archon Fund, Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promises of 
Transparency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 25-28. 
14 China has 13 FTAs in force and has been negotiating 8 new FTAs. China started entering into 
FTAs with other countries only after its accession to WTO in 2001, online: 
<http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/>. China has been actively negotiating bilateral investment 
treaties since the 1980s and has signed 145 BITS, 34 of which are either terminated or not yet in 
force, online: <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42>. Peru has 16 
FTAs in force and it is a member of a regional economic bloc (Andean Community). About 95% 
of all country’s export is regulated by those agreements. Peru is also a part of the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations, online: <http://www.limaeasy.com/business-guide/free-
trade-agreements-ftas-with-peru#signed-agreements>. In addition, Peru has signed 32 BITs, 
4 of which are terminated, online:  
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/165> . 
15 More than 30 percent of all Peruvian mining investment portfolios is hold by Chinese 
companies. See Cynthia Sanborn & Victoria Chann, “Chinese Investment in Peru’s Mining 
Industry: Blessing or Curse?” (2015) Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative 
Discussion Paper No 2015/8 at 2. See also Rebecca Ray, Kevin Gallagher, Andres Lopez & 
Cynthia Sanborn, “China in Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and 
Sustainable Development”, (2015) Boston University Global Economic Initiative, Working 
Group Final Report 04/2015, at 5, online: 
<http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Working-Group-Final-Report.pdf>. 
16 Moises Arce, Resource Extraction and Protest in Peru (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2014), ch 3 at 45-65. 
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international transparency rules, in particular those embedded in international trade and 
investment agreements, have contributed to the two countries’ protection of human rights.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
Transparency is a term frequently used by lawyers, politicians and civil society engaged in 
globalization-fuelled debates about the overarching impact of international trade laws on 
the domestic laws of states, and about good governance, the relationships between citizens 
and state institutions, and the problem of corruption. Transparency is viewed as a necessary 
component in the proper functioning of any democratic state or organization, 17 as the 
principle that underpins the rule of law, and as the key element of good governance as 
embedded in Western ideas of modern statehood founded on the concepts of democratic 
accountability and legitimacy of governance. 18  It has national and international 
dimensions, but it lacks a universally accepted definition.  
 In its national dimension, transparency transcends the realm of legal standards and 
embodies the fundamental moral values of society. It is ‘a standard of judgment of people’s 
conduct.’19 In modern states transparency is accepted as an indispensable condition of 
democratic governance and as the primary tool employed in holding policy makers 
accountable to society.20 Consequently, whenever states or their agencies are involved in 
economic activity, including entering into international trade and investment agreements, 
citizens call for transparency and ‘publicity’21 with respect to the government process and 
for information about the states’ goals and about the outcome. Such requests for more 
information are associated in the literature on democratic governance with the “right to 
know” transparency policies, which guarantee public access to government information, 
and with “targeted transparency” policies which ensure that governments establish 
information services for their citizens and provide them with information otherwise 
unavailable.22 These two generations of transparency policies in democratic states facilitate 
development of what is called “collaborative   transparency” policies, the third generation 
                                                        
17 On theoretical foundations of transparency see Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, “Transparency; An 
Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in International Economic Law” (2005-2006) 27 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 579 and Stephan Schill, “Transparency as a Global Norm in International Public 
Law” (15 September 2014), Kluwer Arbitration Blog, online: 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/09/15/transparency-as-a-global-norm-in-
international-investment-law/>.  Schill argues that “transparency promises more accountable 
more democratic and much more legitimate system of global governance.” Ibid. 
18 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Itacha: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
19 Andrea Bianchi, “Introduction” in Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters, eds, Transparency in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 2. 
20 Anne Peters, “The Transparency of Global Governance”, in Photini Pazartzis & Maria 
Gavouneli, Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment & 
Trade (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 3 at 6. 
21 Anne Peters, ibid. Peters argues that transparency is often used as a synonym for “publicity”, a 
traditional political theory term whose origins could be found in the ancient Greek philosophy 
that linked ‘publicness’ and democracy. 
22 Archon Fund, Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promises of 
Transparency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 24-28. 
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of transparency policy. Collaborative transparency has been made by an unprecedented 
development in information and communications technology, that allows members of the 
public to be both users of information and initiators of transparency systems, transforming 
them into actors who share and monitor information.23 According to Archon Fund, Mary 
Graham and David Weil, governments operate in the most efficient and democratic manner 
when all three generations of transparency policies are working together.24  
 The international dimension of transparency, often related to the legitimacy and 
quality of governance in global institutions,25 is equally complex and it is controversial. 
On one hand, transparency plays an instrumental role in the proper functioning of 
international organizations by increasing their effectiveness, their accountability, and the 
legitimacy of their rules and procedures.26 On the other hand, international transparency 
has an impact on the domestic laws of a state by influencing the transparency of these laws, 
the administrative decisions, and procedures that facilitate competition, trade and foreign 
investment. Thus, the transparency principle is central to the full functioning of the world 
trade system.27 Despite the positive impact of the principle on the functioning of the global 
trade regime, there is considerable criticism of the impact that the international rules of 
transparency have on the regulatory governance of individual states when they are imposed 
                                                        
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Peters, supra note 20. The term “quality of governance” is broadly determined as ‘the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.’ See Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–
2002,” (2004) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3106 at 3. According to the 
authors, determination of the quality of governance involves examination of activities of 
governments and institutions with respect to their adherence to the rule of law, their 
accountability, efficiency, and transparency.  
26 See for example, Robert Wolfe, “Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: How Transparency 
Brings the Trading System to Life”, (2013) Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013/03, Gregory 
Shaffer, “How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance” (2015) 9 
Regulation & Governance 1, Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, “The Adoption of 
Transparency Policies in International Governance Institutions: Justifications, Effects and 
Implications” (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 119, Allen Buchanan & Robert 
O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” (2006) 20 Ethics & 
International Affairs 405, Aarti Gupta, “Transparency under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in 
Global Environmental Governance” (2008) 8 Global Environmental Politics 1. 
27 Article X of the GATT 1994 is the central transparency related provision that imposes an 
obligation on all members to the WTO to publish all applicable laws and regulations and to 
administer them properly. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the 2002 Statement 
to Implement APEC Transparency Standards states: ‘[Transparency] is a basic principle 
underlying trade liberalization and facilitation, where the removal of barriers to trade is in large 
part only meaningful to the extent that the members of the public know what laws, regulations, 
procedures and administrative rulings affect their interests, can participate in their development, 
can participate in administrative proceedings applying them and can request review of their 
application under domestic law.’ See online: UNCTAD 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctaddiaeia2011d6_en.pdf>.  
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as a condition of membership in international organizations.28 Such criticism is frequently 
made of the WTO and other systems of international economic law, such as international 
investment law and the law governing international finance.  
 Recently, it has been argued that there is a genuine “transparency turn” in 
international law and governance as all major areas of international law, particularly human 
rights laws and international economic law, impose numerous transparency-related 
requirements on the functioning of international institutions (the so-called transparency OF 
governance) and states (the so-called transparency FOR governance).29  
 
A. International Trade and Investment Treaties 
 
The transparency turn in international law suggests that multiple international treaties 
impose a variety of transparency obligations on the states that entered into these treaties. 
For example, at the multilateral level, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), 30  without defining transparency, imposed on states mandatory transparency-
related obligations.31 Those GATT obligations required the contracting states to publish 
domestic trade-related laws and regulations, to administer their laws and regulations in an 
impartial manner, and to publish the agreements affecting international trade policy that 
were in force between their government or government agencies and the governments or 
government agencies of any other contracting parties (GATT Article X). GATT also 
imposed several transparency-related obligations in order to eliminate or reduce non-tariff 
barriers to trade (GATT Articles XI:1 and XVII:1). The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements that succeeded the GATT trade regime imposed additional transparency-
related provisions but, like GATT, did not include a definition of transparency. The WTO 
agreements provided institutional support for: monitoring the compliance of states with 
their WTO obligations and for the enforcement mechanism and remedies available to states 
in case of other states’ violation of the obligations.  
 Both the GATT and the WTO transparency rules apply to trade related issues and 
do not directly relate to individual human rights. Binding WTO transparency rules address 
states as both obligors and obligees but they are only enforceable through claims brought 
by one state against another and before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Remedies for 
violations are available to states in the form of retaliatory trade sanctions until the measure 
violating the WTO rule is repealed or amended. These binding rules affect the WTO 
members’ domestic regulatory quality, particularly their transparency laws and policies, 
benefiting private parties, (foreign and domestic) —suppliers of goods and services, 
consumers, and investors. Thus, the WTO transparency rules do have a cascading or a 
                                                        
28 Shaffer, supra note 26. 
29 Peters, supra note 12 at 4-5. See also Anne Peters, “Towards Transparency as a Global Norm” 
in Bianchi & Peters, eds, supra note 19, at 534. See also Megan Donaldson & Benedict 
Kingsbury, “The Adoption of Transparency Policies in Global Governance Institutions: 
Justifications, Effects, and Implications” (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
119, and Rachel M. Gisselquist, “Good Governance as a Concept, and why This Matters for 
Development Policy” (2012) United Nations University WIDER Working Paper No 2012/30. 
30 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 194. 
31 Zoellner, supra note 17 at 591. 
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spillover effect on individual rights enabling them to make better-informed decisions not 
only about their economic but also about political, social and cultural rights.  
 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) provides a form of an assessment 
of each WTO member’s trade policies and practices through periodical WTO Secretariat 
reports and the review meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body. The assessments thus 
provided are not utilized in the enforcement of specific transparency related WTO 
obligations nor do they impose any additional obligations on non-complying member 
states. Therefore, the assessment process is not a substitute for domestic governance 
institutions and domestic transparency reforms. What it does do is to provide a collective 
evaluation of members’ trade policies and practices and valuable feedback to the reviewed 
members as to the impact of their policies on the functioning of the multilateral trade 
system. The greater a member’s weight in the multilateral trading system, the more 
frequent is its TPRB review. China’s trade policies and practices have been reviewed once 
every four years32 while Peru’s have been reviewed every six years.33 There have been five 
TPRM reports on China since that country’s accession to the WTO in 2001. These Reports 
have revealed increased transparency in the country’s trade policies and practices, but they 
have highlighted areas of concern, such as insufficient transparency in government 
procurement, in competition policy, and in government support for state owned 
enterprises34. There have been four reviews of Peru’s trade polices and practices, the most 
recent in 2013, indicating that Peru has improved transparency in government trade policies 
and practices.35 
 FTAs often extend the WTO transparency rules by requiring their signatories to 
comply with more comprehensive transparency provisions, especially if they address 
regulatory cooperation of the parties. 36  Research conduced for the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that countries with good 
governance and institutions firmly based on democratic ideals include provisions requiring 
                                                        
32 Other three major trading powers reviewed every two years are the European Union, The 
United States, and Japan. 
33 Most of the member states, that is, developing countries and economies in transition, are 
reviewed every six years. 
34 See China’s TPR 2014, WT/TPR/S300/China. 
35 See Peru’s TPR 2013, WT/TPR/S/289. 
36 See, Bernard Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, “Regulatory Spillovers and the Trading System: 
From Coherence to Cooperation” (2015) E15 Task Force on Regulatory Systems Coherence, 
ICTSD, World Economic Forum & the EUI, Overview Paper, online: 
<http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/E15-Regulatory-OP-Hoekman-and-
Mavroidis-FINAL.pdf >.  See also Jacues Bourgeois, Kamala Dawar & Simon J. Evenett, “A 
Comparative Analysis of Selected Provisions in Free Trade Agreements” (October 2007) The 
Study Commissioned by the DG Trade of the European Commission, online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138103.pdf>. The FTAs 
negotiated by the EU and the US with developing countries often impose requirements for a 
higher level of transparency with respect to policy areas such as IP protection and competition 
policy. See Henrik Horn, Petros Mavroidis & Andre Sapit, “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of 
EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements” (2009) Breugel Blueprint Series, Volume II, online:  
<http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/bp_trade_jan09.pdf>. 
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greater transparency in their trade agreements with developing countries.37 Consequently, 
North-South agreements are ‘more transparency-intensive than North-North or South-
South agreements.’38 China, in particular, states that it does not include good governance 
provisions and promotes economic cooperation with other developing countries with no 
interference in their domestic politics (“no-strings-attached”39). The agreements between 
OECD countries and non-OECD countries are particularly strict in their transparency 
requirements40 because OECD countries use FTAs as ‘a vehicle for disseminating best 
practices in transparency, particularly to countries where administrative systems may be 
less mature.’ 41  
 Transparency rules in international investment law tend to develop on the basis of 
models and practices of those states that are strongest economically and thus have more 
clout in negotiating the BITs. 42  Since the late 1980s and the formulation of the 
Washington Consensus, international investment agreements (IIAs), including BITs, 
have contained provisions for good governance and transparency-related duties for the 
regulatory agencies of the developing countries that are hosting investments from 
developed countries. 43  BITs often provide for the establishment of international 
arbitration tribunals as dispute settlement institutions \in lieu of the host state’s 
administrative or judicial institution. Foreign investors benefit directly from BITs by 
being able to make claims related to state violations of treaty obligations, including 
transparency, directly before these arbitral tribunals, circumventing the state’s domestic 
judicial and administrative tribunals. The investors can seek monetary compensation from 
these tribunals for state violations of transparency. In that context, BITs seem to serve as 
substitutes for, rather than as incentives for, governance reform in developing countries. 
                                                        
37 Iza Lejarraga & Ben Shepherd, Quantitative Evidence on Transparency in Regional Trade 
Agreements, (2013) OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 153, TAD/TC/WP (2012) 20/FINAL, at 4. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech during a plenary session at the Asian African Summit in 
Jakarta, Indonesia on April 22, 2015 emphasized that China supports South-South Cooperation 
based on ‘mutual respect and equality’ and that it will ‘continue to offer assistance to developing 
countries with no political strings attached,’ Online: <http://www.voanews.com/content/xi-
rich-nations-should-offer-aid-with-no-strings-attached/2729832.html>. That means that 
China will not link economic cooperation with human rights protection. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II: Transparency, New 
York and Geneva, 2012, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/6 [2012 Transparency Sequel]. 
43 On the Washington Consensus and the World Bank macroeconomic policies see John 
Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, a paper commissioned by Fundación 
CIDOB for a conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance,” 
Barcelona, 24-25 September 2004, online: Peterson Institute for International Economics 
<https://piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf>. See also Jose Alvarez, “What 
are Investment Treaties For?” in Jose Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing 
International Investment (The Hague: All-Pocket, 2011) at 95-177. The US BIT model of 1987 is 
an example of the US practice of using the investment treaty provisions to impose a minimum 
standard of protection of US foreign direct investment by promoting the “fair and equitable 
treatment” of investments and to ensure a stable, predicable and secure legal framework for 
investments. Ibid, at 100. 
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B. International Guidelines and Best Practices  
 
There are very many international treaties that stipulate transparency—the “hard law” on 
governance. Similarly, there are very many international guidelines promoting and 
regulating transparency—the “soft law on governance that regulates the obligations of 
private economic actors, namely multinational corporations and foreign investors, vis-à-
vis host governments and local communities44.   
 The 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the 2005 OECD 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises 45  included the 
principle of transparency and disclosure in their framework of corporate governance.46 
Initially, the 2005 Guidelines were intended to guide regulatory reforms in developed 
countries but the documents have since been accepted as an international standard of good 
corporate governance for all countries where SOEs are significant market actors. 47 Since 
2004, China, which owes its rapid economic development to its numerous SOEs, has been 
involved with OECD in a dialogue on corporate governance, 48  and it has been 
participating in the OECD Corporate Governance Committee meetings since 2010. China 
has also participated in the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization 
Practices and has actively discussed the 2015 revision of the Guidelines with other 
members of that group. 49   
                                                        
44 See Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” 
(2000) 54:3 International Organization 421. The authors define hard law as “legally binding 
obligations that are precise… and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing law”, 
ibid., 421. They define soft law as obligation or an agreement not formally binding, or it is vague 
with respect to the discretion of implementation, or if it does not delegate authority for 
interpreting and implementing law to the third party. See ibid., 422. See also Gregory Shaffer & 
Mark Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance” (2010) 94 Minn. L. Rev. 706 and Andrew Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, 
“International Soft Law” (2010) 2 J. Legal Analysis 171. 
45 OECD, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2005).  OECD published Accountability and Transparency: A Guide for State 
Ownership (OECD Publishing, 2010) as a supplementary set of best practices for governments 
working on implementation of the 2005 Guidelines. In 2015, The Guidelines were revised by 
OECD countries in cooperation with a number of partners and stakeholders, including non-OECD 
countries. See the revised 2015 Guidelines at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-
Guidelines-Corporate-Governance-SOEs-2015.pdf>. 
46 Other principles are: ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, rights 
of shareholders and key ownership functions, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of 
stakeholders, and responsibilities of the board. 
47 Daniel Ho and Angus Young argue that China adopted most of the principles of 2005 
Guidelines on SOEs corporate governance. See Daniel Ho & Angus Young, “China’s Experience 
in Reforming its State Owned Enterprises; Something New, Something Old and Something 
Chinese?” (2013) 2:4 Int’l J. Economy, Management and Social Science 84 at 84. 
48 On the activities of the 2004 China-OECD Corporate Governance Policy Dialogue see online:  
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/ChinaOECDCorpGovfinal.pdf> . 
49 See the revised 2015 Guidelines online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Guidelines-
Corporate-Governance-SOEs-2015.pdf>.  
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 The 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 50  another 
example of the relevant soft law, addresses transparency by recognizing states’ duties to 
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms 51 . Although not 
binding on states, the Principles set expectations for states to enforce domestic human 
rights standards on all businesses operating within their jurisdiction. This includes the 
possibility of the states enforcing domestic measures with extraterritorial implications.52 
The commentary of the Principles makes it clear that one requirement of states’ and 
businesses’ responsibility to respect and protect human rights is that they must have in 
place transparency policies and measures53 and that they must share relevant information. 
The Principles recognizes that the obligations of states and businesses to protect 
individuals against business-related abuse must be matched with appropriate and effective 
remedies available in case of violations.54 Next, grievance mechanisms, including a range 
of remedies, should be available to individuals and groups through efficient state and non-
state grievance institutions such as state judicial, administrative and legislative 
mechanisms.55 The Principles also proposes the establishment of grievance mechanisms 
administered by business actors, industry, or, collaboratively, by multiple stakeholders on 
the basis of their codes of conduct and performance standards.56 It specifically points to 
the transparency of the grievance mechanisms as a determinant factor in their 
effectiveness. 57  Generally, China has responded more positively to the UN Guiding 
Principles than to the OECD initiatives. For example, the China Chamber of Commerce of 
Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals Importers & Exporters has referred to the Principles in 
its Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment, calling for its 
member companies to comply with the UN proposed initiative in their mining operations 
abroad.58 
                                                        
50 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, OHCRG, 17th Sess, A/HRC/17/31 (2011). The Human Rights Council endorsed the 
Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June, 2011. 
51 The 2011 Guiding Principles, I. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights, A. Foundational 
Principles, at 3-4. Those fundamental rights and freedoms include the protection of the rule of 
law, accountability, legal certainty and procedural and legal transparency. Ibid. 
52 The 2011 Guiding Principles, I. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights, B. Operational 
Principles; General State Regulatory and Policy Functions, at 4-6. 
53 The 2011 Guiding Principles at 3, 24, and 35. 
54 The 2011 Guiding Principles, III Access to Remedy, at 27. 
55 Ibid. The suggested remedies may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, monetary or 
non-monetary compensation, punitive sanctions (criminal or administrative), injunctions, 
financial or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions. 
56 The 2011 Guiding Principles, III Access to Remedy, Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms, 
ibid, at 31-33. 
57 Ibid, at 33. 
58 See OECE Insights, Corporate Respect for Human Rights in the Chinese Context, 18 June 
2015, online: <http://oecdinsights.org/2015/06/18/corporate-respect-for-human-rights-in-the-
chinese-context/>. 
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 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)59 is a voluntary initiative 
launched in 2002 by governments, industry, investors, and civil society in the attempt to 
create a global transparency standard for the gas, oil and mining sectors around the world.60 
A multi-stakeholder group consisting of representatives of the government, mining 
companies and civil society performs monitoring and reporting tasks as set out by the EITI 
Standard of implementation. 61  An EITI country report can provide the basis for 
transparency reforms. It can ensure in particular that governments work towards the 
development of all three generations of transparency by fulfilling, first, their own duty to 
inform all stakeholders of their own rules and policies, then by imposing on mining 
companies a duty to disclose information about their money matters (targeted 
transparency), and, finally, by ensuring that civil society is able not only to voice its 
concerns about government policies and business practices but influence them 
(collaborative transparency).62 The EITI Standard also covers all stages of the value chain, 
contract transparency, government expenditures, revenue transfer to local governments, 
social expenditure and infrastructure investments. It sets out the requirements that the 
participating countries must meet in order to become EITI compliant. 63 While China is not 
one of the participating countries, Peru was the first Latin American country to join the 
initiative in 2007 and is considered to be a compliant country.64 At first, the Chinese firms 
in Peru declined to participate in the initiative, but the two cases below indicate that they 
have changed their position on the matter.65 
 
III. TRANSPARENCY TESTED BY PERU AND CHINGA: LAWS, POLITICS 
AND PRACTICE  
 
The analysis of the evolution of transparency rules and practices with respect to the China-
Peru economic cooperation in the extractive industry is organized below as an examination 
of the impact of the mandatory international transparency rules and voluntary guidelines 
relevant to the two countries’ governance laws and practices. The case study illustrates the 
impact of China’s ‘win-win,’ ‘no strings attached’ policy on the development of South-
South agreements and the resulting weak transparency provisions in these agreements. It 
reveals difficulties in managing the implementation of numerous transparency rules 
                                                        
59 Ruben Gonzalez-Vincente, “Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics of 
Market” (2012) 209 The China Quarterly 35 at 40. 
60 See <https://eiti.org/eiti>.   
61 The EITI Standard 2016 is the most recent edition launched at the EITI Global Conference held 
in Lima in February 2016, online: <https://eiti.org/files/english-eiti-standard_0.pdf>.  For 
more information on the EITI see online: <https://beta.eiti.org/about/how-we-work>. 
62 Online: <https://beta.eiti.org/oversight>. 
63 Currently, there are 51 countries implementing the EITI but 31 are compliant with the EITI 
requirements. The EITI Fact Sheet 2016 online: 
<https://eiti.org/files/document/eiti_factsheet_en.pdf>.  
64 Ibid.  
65 See also Jill Shankleman, Going Global: Chinese Oil and Mining Companies and the 
Governance of Resource Wealth (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2009) at 4. 
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imposed by different regulatory bodies through several layers of governance. For several 
decades both Peru and China have engaged with international and regional organization 
for which transparency is a condition of membership. This engagement has involved 
building institutions, processes and means of communication between different layers of 
governance and developing the three generations of transparency. It is not surprising that 
transparency has evolved differently in these two vastly different political and social 
contexts and that the role of state and non-state institutions in monitoring and enforcing the 
implementation of transparency-related reforms, and in mediating communications and the 
division of power among the different layers of governance, has been framed differently in 
these two countries.  
 Laws regulating foreign investment evolved through interaction among different 
layers of governance and different sources of law. Therefore, in an analysis of the Chinese 
investments in Peru consideration must be given to international as well as to law.  That 
includes rules of international economic law such as that of the WTO and the relevant 
FTAs, all of which may directly address the rights and duties of states signatories of these 
agreements, and more specific international law related to the protection of foreign 
investments (such as the ICSID Convention66 and BITs) which also provide remedies to 
foreign investors against states’ violation of their treaty rights. Finally, the analysis of the 
FDI legal regime must include the relevant domestic law, not only commercial, antitrust, 
tax but also constitutional, administrative, and labour, to name a few related areas, which 
provides procedures and remedies for both foreign investors and domestic private parties 
seeking protection of their rights against actions of states and foreign investors.  
 
A. China-Peru Economic Cooperation 
 
Since the 1990s, Peru’s economic development has rested primarily on resource extraction 
and trade and investment liberalization.67 China’s investments in developing countries in 
general, and in Latin American countries in particular, have focused on extractive industry 
projects.68 Since 2010, China has replaced the US as Peru’s largest trading partner and as 
the principal investor in the country’s mining sector.69 The important aspect of the China-
Peru economic cooperation is China’s financial aid to several development projects in Peru. 
These projects form part of the broader Chinese strategy of investment in Latin American 
natural resource industries. China’s loans to Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded 
US $ 22.1 billion in 2014, surpassing the combined financing from traditional sources—
                                                        
66 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, (1965), 575 UNTS 159, 4 ILM 532.  
67 Moises, supra note 16. 
68 Gas and oil sector accounts for 69% of Chinese M&A investment in Latin America from 2009-
2013. See Rebecca Ray & Kevin Gallagher, China-Latin America Economic Bulletin 2015 
Edition, (2015) Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative, Discussion Paper 
2015/9, at 2; online:  <https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2015/02/Economic-Bulletin-
2015.pdf>. The report finds that China’s policy banks have become the largest creditors to Latin 
American governments. Ibid at 1. 
69 Michael J. McGuinness, “Beijing the Matchmaker” (2013) 32:6 International Financial Law 
Review 41 at 42.  
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World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.70 Since 2008 China EXIM Bank 
and the China Development Bank (CDB) have invested more than US $ 2 billion in Peru.71 
Most of China’s lending has been for energy and infrastructure projects, and half of the 
financing has been in the form of commodity-backed loans.72  
 The two countries’ economic cooperation was initially governed by a rather lean 
10-year BIT concluded in 1994.73 When China entered into its first BITs in the early 1980s 
in keeping with its economic strategy to attract FDIs it was also trying to enforce regulatory 
restrictions on foreign investors while supporting domestic SOEs. 74 The 1994 China-Peru 
BIT was more reflective of China’s cautious approach to investing outside of Asia than it 
was of Peru’s interests, which included finding investors for its mining industry projects 
and securing external financial resources needed for economic development. The 1994 BIT 
was consistent with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence of Chinese foreign 
policy. 75  It included no transparency provisions and made no reference to good 
governance.  
 The 2010 China-Peru FTA76 reflects Peru’s experience in negotiating its 2006 FTA 
with the US and China’s new foreign trade practice of modeling its FTAs on NAFTA and 
on the US FTAs that combine the regulation of trade in goods and services with detailed 
rules on foreign direct investments.77 Since 2007, China’s regulatory priority has shifted 
from the regulation of FDIs in China to the protection of Chinese investors abroad. China 
                                                        
70 Ray & Gallagher, supra note 68 at 1. 
71 China-Latin America Finance Database 2013, online: 
<https://www.thedialogue.org/mapList/inted.html#.U4jkyFxteX0>. 
72 Ibid. See also Jon Brandt et al., Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Implications for US Foreign Policy, American University School of International Service, 
December 2012, at 7.  
73 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (China-Peru BIT), 9 June 1994, online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/165/treaty/954>. 
74 The first generation of Chinese BITs provided for ad hoc arbitration, with the scope of 
arbitrability limited to determining the amount of compensation payable for expropriation. It also 
provided for what was, at best, very limited national treatment for foreign investors. See Alex 
Berger, Is China Following the Global Trend Towards Comprehensive Agreements? (Bonn: DIE 
Discussion Paper, 2013) at 7-8. Berger argues that China uses a restrictive, European model of 
BITs.  
75 The five principles are: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful co-existence. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence online: 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.s
html>.   
76 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Peru China-Peru FTA), signed and in effect on March 1, 2010, 
online: <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml> and 
<http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/PER_CHN/Texts_28042009_e/index_e.asp>.   
77 Berger, supra note 74.  
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has become the world’s third largest outward investor,78 and it has focused on concluding 
IIAs that support its SOE investments in natural resource projects overseas.79 Thus, the 
2010 FTA provisions reflect the fact that China’s acquisition of minerals from Peru was 
the primary motivation on its part for the establishment of the free trade area between the 
two countries.80 
 The general transparency provisions of the 2010 China-Peru FTA are included in 
Chapter 13 and they refer only to the obligation of each country to publish the relevant 
laws and regulations that have already been enacted. There is no requirement for the 
disclosure of information on new laws.81 Chapter 13 stipulates that each Party shall respond 
to specific information requests from the other Party but not from individual businesses 
regarding any laws and regulations that it has already enacted.82 These provisions protect 
the right to know and impose a limited duty to disclose on the Parties and their 
governments. In contrast, GATT Article X and the subsequent WTO Marrakesh 
Agreements, such as the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement)83  impose, in addition to the obligation for states to publish all laws and 
regulations already in force the further obligation for their non-discriminatory, open and 
predictable administration of trade policies, including the right to appeal all government 
decisions related to trade policy.84  
 There are no specific transparency provisions in the China-Peru FTA Chapter 10 
on investment. Article 139 on investor-state dispute settlement85 implies that “any dispute 
between an investor of one Party and the other Party in connection with an investment in 
the territory of the other Party,” including disputes related to violations of transparency 
obligations by the other Party government, may be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
for a final and binding resolution. The arbitral tribunal may award to an investor monetary 
damages as a remedy for a loss caused by the action of a government of the Party that 
violates the FTA provisions.86 There are no provisions mandating that states or foreign 
investors must address claims by local communities that their fundamental human rights 
to health of a safe environment, or their labour rights may have had been negatively 
affected by the Chinese investments or decisions made by Peruvian government. These last 
mentioned rights and duties are clearly left to be determined by Peruvian and Chinese 
domestic legislation related to foreign investments, including rules on transparency and 
good governance. 
 
B. Evolution of Transparency in Peru 
 
                                                        
78 Karl P. Sauvant & Victor Zitian Chen, “China’s Regulatory Framework for Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment” (2014) 7:1; China Ec. J. 141 at 141. China is only behind the US and Japan as 
an outward investor. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Shankleman, supra note 65. 
81 China-Peru 2010 FTA, Article 167 (1). 
82 Ibid Article 167(2). 
83 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, Article 2. 
84 GATT, Article X(3). 
85 China Peru 2010 FTA, Article 139(1). 
86 Ibid Article 139(7). 
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Peru’s governance reforms were triggered by its binding international obligations 
undertaken in the 1990s (such as the WTO Agreements) and by political changes on the 
domestic front over the same period. First, the right of public access to information (the 
first generation of transparency) was embedded in the 1993 Constitution in order to bring 
legitimacy to the controversial, autocratic government of Alberto Fujimori.87 However, 
this right was not incorporated in legislation until 2003, when the Ministry Council 
approved the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law [the Transparency 
Law]88  in response to the political instability that peaked upon President Fujimori’s 
resignation in November 2000 amidst corruption scandals and allegations of the misuse 
of public office. The Transparency Law is part of a new targeted transparency policy 
aimed at democratization. These changes have coincided with the development of the 
country’s new economic policy based on Peru’s commitment to the WTO trade rules and 
the liberalization of rules governing foreign investment. 
 According to the Transparency Law, all government information is presumed to 
be public and all people (including non-Peruvian citizens) have the right to request and 
obtain any information from the state. 89 All public bodies and government agencies are 
required to establish websites with a transparency section.90 The statute has imposed an 
obligation on government agents to respond to information requests from all parties and 
to provide consultations where necessary.91 Peru has enacted several subsequent pieces 
of legislation to complement the 2003 Transparency Law,92 to define the government’s 
obligation to self-report and to determine what information is subject to this obligation. 
However, the 2003 Transparency Law has not been particularly effective because the 
government has not yet worked out a clear strategy for its implementation.93 Since the 
country has lacked both political will and technical expertise in public service matters, it 
has failed to establish effective implementation and monitoring of compliance at all levels 
of government.94  
 The Standard Transparency Portal, designed in 2008 by the central government 
in Lima to facilitate user-friendly public access to information on investment projects 
undertaken by government bodies, provides what is essentially a one-way flow of 
information. It is not a forum for the participation of broader society in economic 
decision-making. The site is technologically difficult to maintain, and it is 
administratively difficult to coordinate among 13 ministries, 32 decentralized public 
agencies, 9 regional and 8 local governments.  The time needed to train personnel and 
                                                        
87 World Bank, Implementing Right to Information; A Case Study of Peru (Washington, 2012) at 
1, online: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/
285741-1343934891414/8787489-1344020463266/RTI-CS-Peru-final.pdf>. 
88 Law no. 27806; Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. Ibid at 144. 
89 Ibid at 144. 
90 Ibid. 
91 World Bank, supra note 87 at 14. 
92 These include Law No. 27444 (the 2007 Law on General Administrative Procedure) and the 
2008 Legislative Decree No. 1031 which “aims to improve the efficiency of government business 
activities. See World Bank, supra note 87 at 10. 
93 World Bank, supra note 87 at 43. 
94 Ibid. 
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secure the technical assistance needed to maintain the portal adds yet another level of 
difficulty.  
 Despite the above problems in improving governance and transparency, the 2013 
EITI Report for Peru95 shows that the level of trust between the central government and 
local authorities and communities has improved. In 2011, Peru became Latin America’s 
fist fully EITI compliant country and the first one to enact domestic legislation 
implementing ILO Convention 169 (Lei 29785), which provides the indigenous 
population with the right to prior consultation regarding extractive industry projects 
within their traditional territories.96 Yet, there is still work to be done. The Report finds 
that although half of the taxes paid by the extractive industries have been transferred to 
the regions, tensions remain between the central and local governments with respect to 
the lack of transparency and the distribution of extractive wealth.97 
 In sum, Peru’s transition from first generation of transparency to targeted and 
collaborative transparency has been slow and its local governments’ level of 
noncompliance with the Transparency Law remains significant. The transition is driven 
both by external (international and regional laws) and internal pressure. Legitimacy, 
accountability and efficiency are necessary attributes for the domestic monitoring and 
enforcement institutions and processes, including remedies to protect the rights of all 
stakeholders. Without these attributes in place the right to know and access to information 
has very little impact on the improvement of human rights.  
 
C. Evolution of Transparency in China 
 
Prior to its accession to the WTO China’s regulatory culture of “patrimonial sovereignty” 
favoured governance under the political authority of the Communist Party and denounced 
legal accountability and transparency with respect to the actions of state regulators as 
tools of capitalist states that were inapplicable to Chinese circumstances.98 The 1997, the 
WTO Working Party’s Draft Protocol of Accession was the first document that raised the 
question of China’s commitment to the regulatory standards of governance, the liberal 
principles of government accountability, the rule of law and transparency. The Draft 
                                                        
95 Online: <https://eiti.org/files/Peru-2013-EITI-Report.pdf>. The Report was published in 2015. 
96 Note that Peru ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1994 but until 2011 never introduced domestic 
legislation to facilitate its implementation (2011 Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los 
Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios, Reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organization 
Internacional del Trabajo). See more in Rebecca Ray, Kevin Gallagher, Andres Lopez & Cynthia 
Sanborn, China in Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and Sustainable 
Development, Boston University’s Global Economic Initiative, April 2015, at 11. 
97 See the summary of the 2013 Peru EITI Report online: <https://eiti.org/news/peru-ten-
years-transparency-oil-gas-and-mining>. Similar comments regarding slow decentralization 
are provided in 2014 Chinese Investment in the Peru’s Mining Sector: Corporate Social and 
Environmental Responsibility, American University, at 14, online: 
<https://www.american.edu/sis/gep/upload/Chinese-Mining-in-Peru-Practicum-Final-
Report_5_22_14-1.pdf>.  
98 Pitman B. Potter, Accessing Treaty Performance in China; Trade and Human Rights 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) at 25. The basis of patrimonial sovereignty is that ‘political 
leaders and administrative agencies may be responsible for society but not to it.’ Ibid. 
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Protocol required not only legislative changes but also transformation of China’s 
regulatory culture and practice. The 2001 Protocol of the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO99 imposed on that 
country greater obligations related to the transparency principle than have had to be met 
by any other members. 100  In order to achieve competence and accountability at the 
central, provincial, and municipal government levels and to ensure transparent, simplified 
and consistent procedures by which individuals and companies can challenge its 
administrative laws and decisions,101 a series of administrative law reforms was required. 
Since 2006, all central, provincial and local government agencies have been required to 
inform the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of all changes to trade laws and of the 
implementation of any trade-related measures. Those new measures are then published 
in the China Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation Gazette. 
 The general duty of public disclosure imposed by the WTO on all levels of 
government (central and local) does not apply to Party committees. That is unfortunate 
since it is these committees that make the decisions with important legal ramifications.102 
The new regulations have also failed to address adequately the right of a private party to 
a remedy for a loss caused by unlawful administrative acts. Instead, they focus on 
determining the precise role that local authorities are to play in making administrative 
decisions.103 Thus, in China, although the shift in perception on transparency might not 
be what is needed in order to achieve transparency as interpreted by the WTO, it is 
possible to say that the central government has succeeded in combining its stated goal of 
implementing its WTO transparency obligations with other goals such as ensuring 
political stability in the country.  
 In addition to the incorporation of transparency mechanisms into its legislative 
processes, during the mid-2000s, China began developing corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) rules, including a duty of disclosure regarding the performance of private 
companies and SOEs.104  However, legal scholars cannot agree as to the nature and the 
scope of these CSR duties. Some authors indicate that they are not mandatory and that 
Chinese companies that are involved in FDIs follow them more closely than do 
companies that are involved in the domestic market. Chinese SOEs have little experience 
in engaging with local civil society and labour unions and they still see the CSR as an 
                                                        
99 WT/LI/100 2, November 10, 2001.  
100 See Sylvia Ostry, “China and the WTO: Transparency Issue” 3 UCLA J. Int’l  L. & Foreign 
Aff. 1, Julia Ya Qin, “’WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade 
Organization Legal System” (2003) 37 J. World Trade 483, and Karen Halverson Cross, “China’s 
WTO Accession; Economic, Legal, and Political Implications” (2004) 27 Boston College Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 319. 
101 Ljiljana Biukovic, “Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in 
China and Japan” (2008) 11:4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 803 at 819-821. 
102 On 2007 Regulations on Government Disclosure of Information see Biukovic, ibid, at 820. 
103 Ibid at 821. 
104 2006 Company Law and 2009 Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility in Implementation 
for the State-Owned Enterprises Controlled by the Central Government. See also 3rd Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of China Communist Party, November 2013, online: 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/cpcplenum2013/documents.htm>.  
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additional business cost that eats into their profits.105 Chinese state banks have modified 
their codes of conduct to include environmental and sustainable development guidelines 
but have not developed specific guidelines for transparency.106 However, neither the 
Chinese government nor the state banks financing the SOEs that have been investing in 
Peru’s mining sector provide sufficient oversight with respect to the Chinese companies’ 
impact on the social, labour, health, and environmental rights of local Peruvian 
communities.107 Therefore, Chinese companies operating abroad do comply with local 
standards and laws if local institutions properly monitor their compliance and enforce 
those laws and standards.108 
 Despite these changes in China’s legislation aimed at providing public access to 
information and implementing its WTO transparency related obligations, in a 2009 
survey, 55 per cent of the participating firms from OECD countries reported “medium to 
serious” problems in the transparency and predictability of Chinese laws and policies.109 
Furthermore, 59 percent of the firms reported medium to serious problems with the 
dissemination of information on changes in regulations. 110  The 2013 OECD Report 
reveals that 96 percent of the central government institutions and most of the local 
governments have launched official websites but the level of detail varies significantly 
from site to site.111 China has also created a special website to provide foreign investors 
with information related to its laws and regulations on FDIs. 112  A set of updated 
investment regulations is compiled annually and is posted on this website.113  
 China’s WTO accession has strengthened its “right to access” or first generation 
of transparency policies. This created pre-conditions for developing targeted transparency 
and achieving a higher quality of public services in that country. Despite the significant 
administrative law reforms undertaken, however, problems dealing with remedies 
available to private parties remain unresolved. The 2014 Communiqué of the Fourth 
                                                        
105 Embassy of Sweden in Beijing, A Study on Corporate Social Responsibility Development and 
Trends in China, 2014 at 22, online <http://www.csr-asia.com/report/CSR-development-
and-trends-in-China-FINAL-hires.pdf>.  
106 See Kevin Gallagher, Amos Irwin & Katherine Koleski, The New Banks in Town: Chinese 
Finance in Latin America, (Report to Inter-American Dialogue, February 2012), online: 
<http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf>.  
107 Yuan Wang & Simon Zadek, IISD Report; Sustainability Impact of Chinese Outward Direct 
Investment: A review of the literature, January 2016 at 60. 
108 Ibid, at 41. 
109 OECD, Globalization and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa (19 March, 2009) at 391; online: <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/trade/globalisation-and-emerging-economies_9789264044814-en>.  
110 Ibid. 
111 OECD, Globalization and Emerging Economies, supra note 109 at 392. 
112 Online: <www.fdi.gov.cn>. 
113 Article 2 of the 1993 Constitution of Peru. See 2007 Peru-China Free Trade Agreement: Joint 
Feasibility Study at 58, online:  <http://www.mincetur.gob.pe/newweb/portals/0/Peru-
China%20JFS%20Final.pdf>. Article 65 of the Constitution also recognized the right of 
consumers and users to access information on the goods and services available on the market. 
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Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress requested public participation in 
legislative process but these reforms have yet to be implemented114.  
 The 2015 Regulatory Transparency Scorecard of the US-China Business Council 
recognizes the areas of improvement of transparency policy but it also reveals the need 
for increased openness in government decision making. It shows the following two major 
challenges in measuring the country’s progress towards transparency: (i) the lack of 
clarity about which regulations are subject to the commitment to make information 
available to the public, and (ii) the government’s failure to solicit broad public feedback 
during the drafting of new laws and regulations.115 The Scorecard confirms that there is 
an uneven commitment to government transparency among Chinese regulatory agencies.  
 On December 22, 2015, Chinese Premier Li Kequiang introduced a new guideline 
from the State Council mandating increased government transparency and increased 
public information about government affairs by 2020.116 China’s transparency challenges 
were discussed at the recent G20 meeting in Shanghai. The culture of secrecy under which 
the Chinese government operates (under the direct control of the State Council and 
Chinese Communist Party) was acknowledged.117 Considerable concern was expressed 
over the involvement of the state in economic activity and the possibility of unfair 
treatment of non-state economic actors and foreign investors. Moreover, despite the fact 
that China has embraced the Internet and computer based technology, it is still far from 
committing to collaborative transparency.  
 As mentioned earlier, China’s government is not participating in EITI. China has 
also been reluctant to accept any voluntary transparency initiatives promoted by the OECD, 
although it is more open to the UN programs related to the issues of economic development 
but not human rights in general. China has been promoting South-South cooperation on the 
basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, such as the principle of non-interference in 
the political affairs of developing countries. 
 Most of China’s outward FDIs come from SOEs that are financed by state banks 
such as China Development Bank (CDB) and China EXIM Bank.118 The SOEs that make 
foreign investments are tightly controlled organizations that are subject to centralized 
                                                        
114 Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress (23 
October 2014) online: <http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-
12/02/content_34208801.htm>.  
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state supervision.119 The Communist Party of China controls the agency that supervises 
all SOEs, the Party Organization Department appoints the heads and management of all 
of the big SOEs,120 and one third of all SOE employees are party members. 121  The 
Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), one of the three SOEs that have made the 
largest investments in other developing countries, started out as an agency that was carved 
out of the central government structure in 1979. Since 2008, Chinalco’s investments have 
been financed by China EXIM Bank.  
 
D. China’s Involvement with Resource Extraction in Peru: Evolution of 
Transparency in Practice 
 
China’s FDIs in extractive projects in developing countries are generally criticized for 
serious labour standard violations (including low wages, poor safety measures, and a lack 
of communication with local unions), for withholding information about their investment 
plans and revenue transfers, and for their failure to address the environmental and 
development concerns of the affected local communities. The Shougang and Chinalco 
investment projects in iron ore and copper mines in Peru are no exception.  
 In Peru, China’s first investment in Latin America, the 1992 Shougang acquisition 
of Hierro Peru, particularly its Marcona mining operations, gained a bad reputation because 
of irregularities in the privatization process including a lack of transparency, Shougang’s 
poor performance against local labour and environmental standards, and its failure to fulfill 
its promises to the local community. 122  The company was fined numerous times for 
violations of labour and environmental standards. In both Peru and China, domestic laws 
relevant to direct investments in were not well developed in the early 1990s. Peru’s weak 
institutions were unequipped to the task of monitoring and enforcing the local laws, and 
the absence of a consultation process with local communities contributed to the crisis. At 
the time of the Hierro Peru acquisition, Peru was a party to GATT (since 1951), and a 
member of one regional trade agreement (the Andean Community, since 1969). It was a 
party to only two BITs123 and had not yet entered into any FTAs.  
 Shougang was China’s first state-owned investor in Peru and its first ever major 
direct investment overseas. At the time of the Hierro Peru acquisition, China was not a 
participant in the GATT trade system and had had very little experience with outward 
investments beyond Asia and Africa. In fact, China had not engaged in creation of free 
trade areas prior to its 2001 accession to the WTO. By 1992 China had signed about 30 
investment treaties, primarily with European and Asian countries.124  
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 Peru and China did not have a BIT or an FTA in place at the time of Shougang’s 
acquisition of Hierro Peru. Therefore, the transparency rules applicable to this transaction 
were based on the relevant domestic laws of Peru and China and on general public 
international law, including customary international law. China did not develop any 
significant regulations for outward FDIs until the mid-2000s125. At the time of Hierro 
Peru’s acquisition the Peruvian government was embroiled in a corruption scandal and had 
been accused of a lack of transparency. The whole matter of the acquisition of the Marcona 
mining concession from the government was so problematic that it caused major social 
conflict in the region. The local government had difficulties containing this unrest. 
Peruvian President Fujimori had initiated economic reforms by privatizing many state 
owned mining companies, including Hierro Peru, for which Shougang paid US$188 
million even though the asking price had been only US$22 million. Shougang subsequently 
failed to live up to its commitments—it invested only $38 million instead of the promised 
$150 million, and it continued to operate the mine without modernizing the facilities, 
improving workers safety or protecting the environment.126 Consequently, Hierro Peru had 
a very high accident rate, caused numerous labour strikes and gained a poor reputation in 
the local communities. In 2006, the regional government declared a state of “environmental 
emergency.”  
 Shougang’s project in Peru lacked support from the Chinese government because 
Shougang was a part of an experimental profit-responsibility system devised in the 
1980s.127 As previously mentioned, there was no Chinese regulatory oversight over its 
overseas investments and CSR programs were absent in China during the 1990s. 
Shougang’s lack of international experience, including, regrettably, its lack of an 
understanding of and a willingness to engage with the local communities, the company 
failed to act promptly to remedy consequences of its violation of Peruvian labour and 
environmental standards. According to some reports, after the acquisition, Shougang 
invested US $39 million in local utilities. The company also claimed to have paid US 
$74.75 million in taxes, arguing that half of that should had been given to the community 
in Marcona.128 Shoughang was fined an annual average of US$21,000 for environmental 
standards violations, that was the largest amount ever levied against any Chinese firm in 
Peru.129 In 2014, Shougang Hierro Peru even agreed to participate in the next EITI report 
on Peru. 130 In sum, Shougang has paid for their wrongs with respect to labour and the 
environment and they have presented the company as good corporate citizens on those two 
fronts but it still has work to do on transparency. Even after the company’s website has 
been launched, information about its operations remain sketchy and it is still having 
difficulty in gaining the trust of the local communities.  
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 In 2007, fifteen years after Shougang acquired Hierro Peru, Chinalco purchased the 
Toromocho copper mine from Peru Copper. This has been more of a success story. The 
first investment contract was signed in 2009. It required expansion of the existing 
excavations and that involved hiring more workers and relocating an old mining city that 
had already been contaminated by waste water. The Peruvian government provided support 
for the project by granting Chinalco a long-term tax holiday. 
 Chinalco’s management made significant efforts to improve relations with the 
labour unions. It paid its skilled workers wages that were above the market average for the 
region and has been investing in scholarships and training programs for the local 
population.131 Despite its investment in workers safety, Chinalco had several industrial 
accidents.132 It benefited from keeping not only Toromocho’s advanced mining technology 
but also the existing management, comprised mainly of North-American and Peruvian 
staff. That strategy helped Chinalco to utilize local management practices and fit in with 
local business culture more easily. 133  Thus, although Chinalco did not directly adopt 
international governance standards, it is possible that its more efficient governance would 
be attributed to their indirect adoption through the hiring of pre-existing management and 
staff and its style of engagement with the local communities, and by its reliance on pre-
existing local practices. In 2013, Chinalco agreed that it would in future participate in 
Peru’s EITI.134  
 Chinalco worked very hard to improve transparency and to consult with the local 
communities. After acquisition of the mine, it stepped in to build a new town and to ensure 
voluntary community relocation, the first of its kind in Peruvian history. The process of 
consultation related to the expansion of the mine and the resettlement took the form of a 
Dialogue Table, which is a Peruvian form of governance and negotiations that involves all 
stakeholders, public and private, and also includes civil society. The resettlement 
negotiations were in compliance with Peru’s domestic laws and its commitment to ILO 
169. Despite these consultations, resettlement process of the 5,000 Morococha residents 
did not go smoothly, and even after it was completed in 2013, the local population 
complained that neither Chinalco nor the local government acted in good faith.135  
 Finally, it must be noted that Chinalco responded in a timely manner to 
environmental concerns related to a major leak of the contaminated water in the area. It 
reinforced the waste discharge facilities, built a 400-cubic-meter retention pond in 2013136 
and resumed operations at the mine in 2014.  
 Chinalco’s investment grew out of political and legal circumstances different from 
those surrounding the Shougang project. Chinalco’s operations were subject to 
multilayered international and domestic standards and laws related to FDIs. Both Peru and 
China have felt the impact of the “transparency turn” of the 21st century. They have 
participated in the in multilateral world trade system as WTO members and have immersed 
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themselves in regional economic integration by concluding many FTAs with other 
countries. 137 As previously mentioned, almost 95 percent of Peru’s exports are covered by 
FTAs. China has concluded more than 100 BITs, many of them since the Shougang 
investment in Peru. Peru has also become Latin America’s leader in good governance and 
transparency reforms. It underwent constitutional and administrative reforms in the late 
1990s, joined EITI in 2007 and has made commitment to publish on line the extractive 
companies’ revenue flows. It has also reaffirmed its commitment to honour its international 
human rights obligations (ILO 169) and those to protect the communities living close to 
extractive projects. The Chinese government, too, has also initiated numerous domestic 
policy reforms, aimed at improving transparency, increasing the accountability of public 
and private actors involved in trade and investments, and strengthening the provisions 
related to government agencies’ duties of disclosure to and consultation with private parties 
in the law making process.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has argued that the principle of transparency has been enshrined in 
international trade and investment treaties primarily to facilitate the implementation of 
trade policy goals and to ensure the functioning of transparent, accountable and impartial 
economic governance by states and that its impact on human rights, other than the right of 
individuals to market access, is difficult to assess. Even the anticipation of international 
treaty accession can spark domestic law reforms. 138  Moreover, implementation of 
international laws is a complex process that often takes several years and is affected by 
domestic legal, political, economic and social circumstances. 139  Therefore, the 
proliferation of international transparency laws can operate as one factor influencing 
reforms in domestic governance and can be a catalyst for a worldwide movement to protect 
all human rights, but it cannot be a substitute for domestic reforms. Similarly, global 
governance institutions built to monitor and enforce international transparency laws are not 
substitutes for domestic governance institutions and the remedies available in domestic 
legal systems. As this chapter reveals, developing countries such as China and Peru have 
been undergoing significant domestic governance reforms, partially in response to 
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international challenges but also due to their political decisions to strengthen domestic 
transparency and improve the domestic decision-making process. Despite the fact that both 
countries have created policies to improve the first two generations of transparency, they 
are yet to create the processes and institutions needed for the functioning of collaborative 
transparency. 
  
